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Legitimacy and Policy during Crises:
Subnational COVID-19 Responses in
Bolivia
V. Ximena Velasco-Guachalla, Calla Hummel, Jami Nelson-Nuñez and Carew Boulding
Why did some Bolivian departments have more success containing COVID-19 than others? We argue that low government
legitimacy hampers coordinated responses to national crises, particularly where political polarization is severe and the crisis response
becomes politicized. Low legitimacy can intensify the challenges of poverty and poor infrastructure. An original dataset of daily
observations on subnational coronavirus policy and cell phone mobility data, paired with administrative data on cases and deaths,
suggests that political divisions influenced governors’ policy implementation and citizens’ compliance. In departments that opposed
the president, policies were more likely to deviate from the stricter national policy while mobility and protest activity were high. In
departments aligned with the president, local policy followed national policy and citizens complied with policy and quarantine
restrictions for a longer period of time.
T
he 2020 novel coronavirus pandemic arrived at a
time of heightened political turmoil in many coun-
tries. The United States, Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia
were already deep in political crises around corruption,
polarization, legitimacy of government, and worries about
democratic backsliding when the pandemic began spread-
ing globally in early 2020. These crises shaped
governments’ and citizens’ responses to the pandemic
(Cornelson and Miloucheva 2020; Patel et al. 2020). In
this paper, we explore how polarizing political crises
affected the successes and failures of pandemic policy
responses at the sub-national level in Bolivia.
In Bolivia, the virus spread unevenly across the country,
hitting some places and populations harder than others.
The national government responded swiftly with strict
quarantine measures. However, national policy did not
contain the pandemic within Bolivia and cases exploded
when the national government devolved policy to local
governments. After two hundred days, per capita cases and
deaths were on par with Brazil and Peru, which were
among the worst-hit countries in the Americas, and some
Bolivian departments1 experienced the highest per capita
death rates in the world (Trigo, Kurmanaev, and McCann
2020). Why did some Bolivian departments have more
success containing the pandemic than others?
We argue that the recent political crises and polariza-
tion over the legitimacy of the government created
conditions in Bolivia that hindered a coordinated
response and led to different outcomes around the
country. Political turmoil around the legitimacy of the
government created a crisis of legitimacy at various levels
of government and heightened polarization between
supporters of the interim government and opponents.
We are specifically referring to polarization around legit-
imacy of the government, where supporters and oppon-
ents of the government hold very strong and often
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incompatible views of the legitimacy of the administra-
tion itself. Low legitimacy weakened incentives for com-
pliance, cooperation, and coordination in public policy
implementation. Politicized compliance and coordin-
ation then led to worse outcomes in terms of cases and
deaths, and exacerbated pre-existing inequalities.
Bolivia is a case of the politicization of health policy in a
political crisis, with important lessons for other democra-
cies in crisis. Similar to the United States and Brazil, its
institutions give local governments power to oppose
national policy. Again similar to the United States and
Brazil, Bolivia experienced rising polarization prior to the
pandemic, particularly after a constitutional referendum in
2016. This initial polarization increased dramatically fol-
lowing a political crisis in 2019. During the crisis, the
longstanding president, Evo Morales, resigned and the
interim president, Jeanine Añez, unleashed police brutality
on protesters and prosecuted her political opponents
(Anria and Roberts 2019; Lehoucq 2020; Mamani
2020). In this paper we explore how these conditions of
polarization and political crisis shaped the Bolivian
response to the novel coronavirus and health outcomes.
Our team collected daily data on novel coronavirus pol-
icies, cases, deaths, mobility, and protests from Bolivia’s nine
departments from March through September of 2020. We
gathered monthly administrative data on all deaths reported
at the departmental level from the Civil Registry Service
(SERECI 2020), and The New York Times. We find that
when the national government devolved policy to local
governments, cases spiked throughout the country but par-
ticularly in opposition departments where protests were
higher and governors relaxed policies. While inequality in
resources and state capacity helped some local governments
and hurt others, lack of legitimacy blocked the national
government’s rushed attempts to set strict quarantine pol-
icies. We find that after most subnational governments
decided to ease coronavirus restrictions, the two poorest
and opposition-controlled departments reported an increase
in overall deaths in July thatwas over seven times their average
monthly deaths while the wealthiest department saw overall
deaths peak in August at twice the average monthly deaths.
The article proceeds with a background section outlin-
ing Bolivia’s experience with and response to the novel
coronavirus pandemic before elaborating the theoretical
ramifications of political crisis, low legitimacy, and politi-
cization of health policy and setting out hypotheses. We
then describe our data collection sources, protocols, and
methodology. We present the results of our descriptive
data analysis, focusing on administrative data, cellphone
mobility data, and a subnational policy index developed in
conjunction with teams at Oxford University and the
Observatory for the Containment of COVID-19 in the
Americas at the University of Miami (Hale et al. 2020;
Knaul et al. 2020). We paired this data with protest event
count data that we collected for all Bolivian departments.
We conclude with implications for developing democra-
cies in crisis.
Background: The Novel Coronavirus in
Bolivia
The Ministry of Health identified Bolivia’s first two
COVID-19 cases on March 10, 2020. The national
government responded swiftly, closing schools, cancelling
events and gatherings, imposing a national curfew and
travel restrictions within a few days, and then closing
Bolivia’s borders and ordering a strict national quarantine
that started on March 22 (Ministerio de la Presidencia
21 Marzo 2020). The quarantine slowed but did not
contain the virus. Santa Cruz’s initial cases quickly became
dozens and the department experienced community
spread by April and a collapsing hospital system in May.
Oruro initially appeared to contain its cases but periodic
outbreaks reemerged. La Paz and Cochabamba reported
their first cases before the quarantine and continued to
experience community spread during confinement. Sev-
eral departments entered quarantine with no cases but
reported confirmed COVID-19 cases in the first week:
Potosi on March 26, Chuquisaca on March 27, Pando on
March 28, and Tarija on March 30. Beni, the exception,
reported its first case on April 20 but within two weeks of
the first case, the case count reached into the hundreds and
the department health system collapsed as health care
workers became too sick to staff hospitals and clinics.
On May 22, Beni’s governor declared a health disaster
and emergency in the department due to the rapid spread
of the virus (Agencia Boliviana de Información 2020).
Bolivia experienced the arrival of the pandemic in the
middle of an ongoing political crisis which set the conditions
for the politicization of health policy and an uneven response
to the public health crisis (Hummel et al. 2020). Here, we
briefly present the background context needed to under-
stand how the pandemic developed in Bolivia, focusing on
the political crisis of 2019–2020, the institutional context
that allowed for the central government to delegate policy to
departments, and the state of the health care system.
Political Crisis
Bolivia is a landlocked, low-income country of 11 million
people with a turbulent political history. Under the
administration of Evo Morales, who first won election in
2005 and resigned in 2019, and the Movement towards
Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo or MAS), the Bolivian
government oversaw sweeping social programs, sustained
economic growth, and substantial reductions in poverty
and inequality (Mamani 2020). The administration cre-
ated a pension system that guarantees monthly cash
payments to all Bolivians over 60, expanded cash transfer
programs to families, and quintupled the minimum wage
(Anria and Niedzwiecki 2016, Niedzwiecki and Anria
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2019). Under the economic policies of the former finance
minister and then president Luis Arce, between 2005 and
2018 economic growth averaged nearly 5% a year, GDP
per capita more than tripled, the percentage of Bolivians
living in poverty fell from 60% to 35% of the population,
and inequality declined from a GINI index of 58.5 to
44 (Farthing 2019; World Bank 2020).
While the Morales government oversaw unprecedented
economic growth, it was also plagued by corruption
scandals and democratic backsliding. The most notorious
move towards consolidation of power happened when the
Morales administration held a constitutional referendum
to abolish term limits in February 2016 and then ignored
the unfavorable results (Mamani 2020). Following the
October 2019 presidential election, protests broke out
around the country over allegations of electoral fraud.
Former Morales supporters, trade unions, the police,
and the military joined the opposition’s calls for Morales
to resign and he stepped down on November 10, 2019
(Derpic 2019). Jeanine Añez, a little-known opposition
senator and the second vice president of the senate,
assumed the presidency. Her ascension to power was
met with strong opposition from Morales’ supporters
and a wave of protests wracked the country after her
inauguration. Añez sent police and military into the
streets, police opened fire on two largely indigenous
protests and by the end of November, thirty-five people
had died in the crisis (Chaski Clandestina 2019; Derpic
2020). Añez appointed a disparate collection of opposition
figures to her administration. Prior to the pandemic, the
interim administration had primarily focused on prosecut-
ing former officials from Morales’s MAS party.
Institutional Context
Bolivia entered the pandemic with a central government
that lacked widespread support or legitimacy and political
institutions that allowed for a decentralized response.
Decentralization reforms swept Latin America in the
1990s (McNulty 2019; O’Neilll 2005) and Bolivia set
an early example with its 1994 Law of Popular Participa-
tion (Anria 2018; Farthing and Kohl 2014; Madrid 2012;
Fauget 2012). The law transferred legislative power and
considerable resources to Bolivia’s nine departmental and
339 municipal governments. The 1994 decentralization
reform has been replicated around the world and hailed as
a way to make government more efficient and responsive
to local needs (Faguet 2012). This institutional arrange-
ment offered a way for the central government to avoid
taking the blame for unpopular pandemic response pol-
icies and meant that there was a mechanism to devolve
decision-making to local health departments.
Bolivia entered the pandemic with a fragile healthcare
system, a struggling education apparatus, and crumbling
national infrastructure. All Bolivians are entitled to public
healthcare but in practice public hospitals are understaffed,
undersupplied, and struggle with corruption (Gray
Molina, Rerez de Rado, and Yañez 1999). Few hospitals
exist outside of large cities and in March 2020, the entire
department of Pando did not have a fully functioning
hospital. Prior to the pandemic, Bolivia had only thirty-
five functioning intensive care beds (Escalera-Antezana
et al. 2020). While the Morales administration pledged
to modernize Bolivia’s infrastructure, most of the nation’s
roads are falling apart, which complicates even the delivery
of medical supplies to the existing hospitals and clinics.
Corruption made the situation worse: the interim
government announced in March 2020 that it was spend-
ing millions to buy 170 ventilators but when the ventila-
tors arrived, they did not meet intensive therapy standards
(Kitroeff and Taj 2020). The health minister and others
had overcharged the state, accepted kickbacks, and
received substandard equipment. The country experi-
enced a wave of protests denouncing corruption, the
government’s pandemic response, and the lack of personal
protective equipment and medical supplies.
Under pressure, the national government delegated
much of the containment policy to local governments on
June 1, 2020, after which COVID-19 cases exploded across
Bolivia. In June and July, a wave of cases forced hospitals to
close as their staff were infected and to turn patients away,
leading to hundreds of bodies left in the streets and burial
services collapsing across the country (Cuevas 2020; Con-
dori R. 2020; Peñaranda 2020). Amid a wave of protests,
the national government postponed, for a third time, in-
person presidential elections to October 18, announced a
post-confinement phase starting September 1, and allowed
in-person political campaigns to start on September 6 (Min-
isterio de la Presidencia 27 Agosto 2020). On September
10, six months into the pandemic, Bolivia had 124,204
confirmed COVID-19 cases, a 29% positivity rate, 7,193
confirmed deaths from COVID-19, and 19,000 more
deaths than by the same time in 2019.
Politicized Health Policy andGovernment
Legitimacy in a Crisis
Structural factors associated with poverty and low govern-
ment capacity, including health infrastructure, informal
sector labor, endemic corruption, and high rates of pov-
erty, explain some of the variation in pandemic outcomes
in Bolivia and elsewhere (Hummel et al 2021). We argue,
however, that political dynamics are critical to understand-
ing how the pandemic unfolded in Bolivia. All policies,
even health policy, can be politicized or bureaucratized to
varying degrees. While disasters and crises sometimes
represent moments of unity and are put in the hands of
experts (Baekkeskov and Rubin 2014), protracted and
publicly salient crises can provide opposition actors oppor-
tunities to challenge government responses. We argue that
crises of legitimacy, such as the one Bolivia was
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experiencing as the pandemic hit, can intensify the politi-
cization of policy responses to a crisis like the COVID-19
pandemic. In the absence of a unifying national response,
pandemic policy becomes entangled with partisan divi-
sions, resulting in unequal policies, unequal compliance,
and unequal health and mortality outcomes.
We see the crisis of legitimacy of the central government
as important in two ways. First, a central government
without strong popular or elite support faces high barriers
to enacting unpopular policies, even if necessary. Despite
the need for a coordinated response (Zoraster 2006), crises
of legitimacy increase the likelihood that government actors
will politicize decisions around policy responses (Zoraster
2006). Where pre-existing political structures can facilitate
dissent, coordination is likely to break down where oppos-
ition to the national government is greatest. Recent schol-
arship suggests that political divisions between local
governments and national administrations can obstruct
policies initiated by national governments (Fenwick 2016;
Niedzwiecki 2016). For example, Niedzwiecki (2018) finds
that co-partisan linkages between the national government
and regional governors in Brazil facilitated the implemen-
tation of the acclaimed Bolsa Familia cash transfer program,
while regional leaders of opposition parties in Argentina
blocked the implementation of such transfers. Eaton (2017)
suggests that ideological differences between presidents and
regional leaders can lead to local economic policies that are at
odds with national government stances.
Political divisions between local and national govern-
ments have recurrently emerged in Bolivia (Eaton 2011;
Zegada and Brockmann 2016; Vergara 2018), setting the
stage for contention over pandemic policy. For example,
Hoey (2017) documents the challenges that healthcare
workers faced in implementing theMorales administration’s
ambitious program to eradicate malnutrition. She finds that
political friction arose between the national government’s
program housed in the Ministry of Health and health
centers in departments run by opposition leaders. Coordin-
ation and cooperation are crucial for the delivery of key
medical supplies and support in crises and decentralized
settings can complicate cooperation (Marks and Lebel
2016). Thus, decentralized contexts provide institutional
mechanisms through which actors canmore easily politicize
crisis response. The crisis of legitimacy in Bolivia made it
more likely that actors would actually do so.
Second, crises of legitimacy shape citizen compliance
with government policy, making it harder for citizens to
trust the government’s decisions and more likely that
people will react dismissively or in opposition. Political
legitimacy and trust in government are crucial for volun-
tary compliance, particularly in a protracted crisis. Levi
(1997, 153) argues that “citizens are willing to go along
with a policy they do not prefer as long as it is made
according to a process they deem legitimate, and they are
less willing to comply with a policy they like if the process
was problematic.” Studies have shown strong relationships
between trust, legitimacy, and voluntary compliance
(Lopez-Calva 2019; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Scholtz
and Lubell 1998; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanotti 1993;
Hardin 1991). Polarization between groups in society
makes compromise, coordination, and cooperation more
difficult to achieve across political lines (Sani and Sartori
1983), and is a growing problem in many democracies
(Carothers and O’Donahue 2019). Studies show that
social fragmentation can have dire effects on the distribu-
tion and delivery of public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly 1999) and hinders society’s ability to coordinate
collective action in a crisis (Cornelson and Miloucheva
2020). More specific to the pandemic, where health
policies have been politicized in polarized contexts, citi-
zens are more likely to distrust and resist both government
health officials and doctors (Franklin Fowler and Gollust
2015). The combination of a crisis of political legitimacy
in conjunction with decentralized institutions can there-
fore lead to uneven subnational policy and varying levels of
citizen compliance along partisan lines.
Our argument and the literature on decentralization,
polarization, and legitimacy set out theoretical expect-
ations for how these conditions influenced national and
subnational pandemic responses. Where leaders have
varying degrees of authority to determine policy, imple-
ment or obstruct national policy, galvanize dissent, organ-
ize protest and influence citizen behavior, and where
citizens hold polarized political views, we expect to see
policy responses and citizens’ compliance follow the
patterns in Table 1.
Table 1
2x2 of theoretical expectations for empirical data
Opposition Electorate Pro-Government Electorate
Opposition governor Highest mobility Moderate mobility
Protest most likely Moderate policy
Less restrictive policy Some protest
Allied governor Moderate mobility Lowest mobility
Strict policy Strict policy
Some protest Protest least likely
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If pandemic policy were shaped by partisan concerns, as
we describe here, we expect the patterns laid out in table 1
to appear in our data from Bolivia. Specifically, we expect
that governors from parties that are not allied with the
president will use their autonomy to make less restrictive
policy.We expect opposition voters to defy national policy
by protesting and flouting quarantine restrictions. In
places where the governor and the majority of voters
oppose the president, we expect to see lax policy, many
protests, and high mobility as measured by Android cell
phone data from Google (Google LLC 2020). Where the
governor opposes the president but many voters support
the president, we expect that the governor will relax some
policies and that opposition voters will protest and move
around while others will comply. In places where the
governor is allied with the president and a clear majority
of voters support the president, we expect to see strict
policy from the governor and high compliance from
voters. In Bolivia, several departments have opposition
governors and electorates. Several more have opposition
governors and highly divided voters, where many voters
support the opposition, many voters support the presi-
dent, and the rest are wary of all politicians and parties.
Only one department has an allied governor and a clear
majority of voters who support the president. No depart-
ment has an allied governor and an opposition-dominated
electorate, but we filled out the 2x2 for completeness and
generalizability.
Note that the outcome we expect in this context is that
the opposition will flout the policy of the national gov-
ernment — regardless of left-right ideology. We expect
dynamics to be partisan rather than ideological. With the
elections that were canceled in 2019 and the political crisis
that ensued, voters sorted into partisan MAS and anti-
MAS blocs (Arequipa Azurduy 2020). Returning to our
specific expectations for the data, the Bolivian national
government acted quickly with restrictive measures, thus,
we expect to see the opposition flout restrictions. In
countries where the national government ignored the
pandemic, we expect to see the opposition call for, enact,
and comply with restrictions. We expect this dynamic to
occur regardless of party ideology. We evaluate subna-
tional variation in experiences with the novel coronavirus
in Bolivia using original and administrative data. In the
following section, we explain how we collected and ana-
lyzed the data and then detail the results.
Methodology
We analyze mobility, protest, and COVID-19 cases and
deaths to assess the effect of legitimacy on the pandemic
response. Mobility data comes from Android cellphone
location data compiled by Google. Mobility is a proxy for
citizen compliance with government stay-at-home direct-
ives and transportation restrictions: we assert that in places
where mobility averages go down and stay low, people
comply with restrictions whereas in places where mobility
does not decrease or decreases and then increases, people
do not comply with restrictions.
Protest data comes from local daily newspaper reports
of protests and is a proxy for legitimacy: we assert that
where people protest the government in large numbers,
they question the legitimacy of the government and its
actions. Several departments, including Potosí and Tar-
ija, explicitly banned protest in their initial pandemic
decrees, hence protesting is also a clear sign of noncom-
pliance with those departments’ pandemic policies.
COVID-19 cases and deaths come from national and
local departments of health and proxy the abilities and
success of the local and national governments in con-
taining the pandemic: where cases and deaths rise, we
assert that governments are either unable or unwilling to
contain the pandemic, and where cases and deaths
decrease or stay steady, governments are able and willing
to mitigate the pandemic.
We collected daily national- and departmental-level
data on COVID-19 cases, deaths, protests, and public
policies to prevent and contain the virus fromMarch 10 to
September 25, 2020.We tracked ten policy areas since the
first confirmed cases on March 10. The variables and the
index that we built are based on the Oxford COVID-19
Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) 5.0, which
measures the government response to the pandemic (Hale
et al. 2020; Knaul et al. 2020; Hummel et al. 2020). We
track stay-at-home orders, school closings, office closings,
suspension of public transportation, maskmandates, event
bans, restrictions on gatherings, information campaigns,
domestic travel restrictions, and international travel
restrictions. All policy variables have a value between
0 and 1. In coding, we consider whether each measure
was in effect each day and we code whether its application
was partial or total. Please see the codebook and tables of
the variables in the online appendix for more details.
We construct a policy index of these ten variables using
Knaul et al. (2020)’s index construction (see the online
appendix for the full index construction). Early policy
action carries more weight in the index and late policies
add smaller values. The index gives every subnational
government a daily score between 0 and 100, where
0 means that no policies have ever been in place and
100 signifies that all policies have been in place from the
first case.
To collect daily data, we combed the official websites of
Bolivia’s nine departmental governments, as well as the
websites, press releases, and public databases of the Min-
istry of Health, the Ministry of Communication, the
Ministry of Public Works, the National Institute of Stat-
istics, the Bolivian Information Agency, the Civic Register
(SERECI), and the official information service for
COVID-19, Bolivia Segura (https://www.boliviasegura.
gob.bo/). We added information from the Departmental
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Health Service (SEDES) of each department and reports
from the independent national and local news media.
The mobility data comes from Android cell phones that
use Google location services and the data is compiled by
Google. The data covers aggregate changes in mobility
across six categories and is available at the provincial,
departmental, and national level. We compile the leisure
and commercial categories into a daily departmental aver-
age and a seven-day running average. Google releases
public data online at https://www.google.com/covid19/
mobility/. Note that most Bolivians have a cell phone and
many people who do not have a home computer instead
buy Android smartphones. A 2018 study on cellphone
usage in Bolivia found that individuals are increasingly
opting for Android as their preferred operating system over
alternatives. The study highlights that only 7.7% of
Samsung Galaxy users switched to Apple while the
remaining 92.3% continued to use smartphones with
Android operating systems. Among those who switched
their iPhones, 18% chose Samsung devices instead
(Redacción Central Bolivia en Tus Manos 2019). Add-
itionally, we expect that internet connectivity via smart-
phone has increased in the last year as internet access has
become more central to accessing information, education,
and social assistance. Between 2015 and 2020, internet
access in the country grew significantly and of all internet
connections, 91.99% are established through mobile
access technologies (Autoridad de Regulacion y Fiscaliza-
cion de Telecomunicaciones y Transporte 2020).
We verified and triangulated data by checking numbers
and codes with team members and with different sources
of information. We code public policies using official
national, departmental, and municipal decrees and laws.
The daily case and death numbers come from the SEDES
of each department. We suspect that the official numbers
are lower than actual infections because there has been a
shortage of tests in Bolivia since March 2020 and the
World Health Organization recommends a positivity rate
of less than 3%. In Bolivia, the positivity rate fluctuated
between 5% inMarch, up to 65% in July, and dropped to
35% in September (OurWorld in Data 2020), suggesting
that many cases were not diagnosed. The numbers
reported by the SEDES, the Ministry of Health, and
independent media are the same, suggesting that the
underreporting of confirmed cases is due to the scarcity
of tests and not systematic manipulation of the data.
Results
The intense politicization of health policy across the
Bolivian departments contributed directly to the lack of
coordination and compliance during the pandemic. Hun-
dreds of anti-government and pro-election protests took
place throughout quarantine but so did pro-government
and anti-MAS demonstrations (Laserna 2020). Both
groups challenged each other using a form of political
participation that was in direct violation of lock-down
regulations. In this section, we demonstrate that protest
activity was highest in places with opposition governors
and electorates. We then show that once the national
government delegated policy decisions to local govern-
ments, opposition governors with opposition electorates
relaxed policies the most. We show that cases and deaths
spiked across the country after local governments exercised
more autonomy in policy implementation. Finally, we
demonstrate that the pandemic exacerbated pre-existing
inequality, with the poorest departments experiencing the
highest increases in deaths.
We use original quantitative data from Bolivia’s nine
departments and administrative data to make our case.
Referring back to the theoretical expectations in table 1,
we classify Bolivia’s departments in the 2x2 in table 2. We
classify the departments based on the party of the governor
and vote shares from the 2019 presidential election. The
classification indicates ideal-type departments like Cocha-
bamba (opposition electorate and governor) and Tarija
(pro-Añez governor and electorate) that fit the classifica-
tion and the expectations. The 2x2 also identifies several
mixed-case departments, where the governor and elector-
ate are not aligned with each other, and predictably mixed
outcomes for mobility, protest, and policy.
The opposition governor and electorate departments
generally followed our expectations, as did the allied
governors and divided electorates. We have classified
electorates as fully opposition or divided, because only
Tarija had an electorate that was solidly behind President
Añez and her allies. Most electorates are either overwhelm-
ingly in support of former president Morales and theMAS
party or are deeply divided. The opposition governor and
divided electorate category is mixed, with some depart-
ments resembling opposition-opposition departments and
others combining characteristics of both categories. For
example, the president was from Beni and many voters
there supported her but the governor was from the MAS
and many voters were staunch MAS supporters. Table 3
summarizes key departmental descriptive statistics on
demographics, the economy, and politics.
Protests took place in all departments between March
and September 2020, and roughly half of all protest events
happened in the opposition departments of Cochabamba,
La Paz andOruro (about 48%). Of all protest events, 24%
took place in Cochabamba, 17% in La Paz, 17% in Santa
Cruz, 9.9% in Chuquisaca, and 7% in Oruro. Protests in
Santa Cruz were concentrated in areas with opposition
voters. There were two periods of protest with distinct
demands: health-related demands dominated protests
fromMarch to July, whereas election demands dominated
demonstrations throughout August, as table 4 shows.
Protests demanding elections that took place during the
first weeks of the Añez administration resurfaced during
the first months of quarantine, and continued through the
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confinement phase, reaching a climax in early August.
Elections in Bolivia were first scheduled to take place on
May 3, but due to the health crisis, elections were post-
poned to September 6 and then once more to October 18.
While the initial delay to September 6 was agreed upon by
political actors across the ideological spectrum, the second
delay generated conflict and waves of protest that block-
aded the country’s main cities and highways for almost two
weeks (Trigo, Kurmanaev, and McCann 2020). At this
point, almost four months had passed since the new
coronavirus entered the country, cases were on the rise,
and the economy and health systems had collapsed inmost
departments. For many political actors and analysts, elec-
tions were seen as the only pathway to pacify the country
and to avoid greater ungovernability (Zegada 2020).
A final ingredient that fueled protests and further
undermined the credibility of the interim government
was the revelation of corruption scandals directly linked
to the provision of medical supplies. In this respect, two
findings in the literature are relevant to the Bolivian case.
Table 2
Bolivian departments classified by governor’s and electorates’ partisanship
Opposition Electorate Pro-Government Electorate
Opposition
governor
Expectation: less restrictive policy, high
mobility, most protest
Expectation: moderate policy, moderate
mobility, some protest
Cochabamba: less restrictive policy, high
mobility, high protest
Beni: strict policy, high mobility, few
protests
La Paz: less restrictive policy, moderate
mobility, high protest
Chuquisaca: strict policy, low mobility,
some protest
Oruro: less restrictive policy, highmobility,
some protest
Pando: moderate policy, high mobility,
few protests




Expectation: strict policy, moderate mobility,
some protest
Expectation: strict policy, low mobility, few
protests
No departments fit this category Santa Cruz: strict policy, low mobility,
some protest





































Beni 480,308 2,403 449 85 −43 3.1% MAS*** 34%
Chuquisaca 637,013 3,276 1,388 85 −60 9.9% MAS 49%
Cochabamba 2,028,639 3,109 2,463 85 −55 24.1% MAS 66%
La Paz 2,926,996 3,988 3,775 84 −53 17% Sol.bo 68%
Oruro 551,116 3,793 548 86 −55 7.4% MAS*** 63%
Pando 154,355 2,449 120 83 −37 0.1% MAS 46%
Potosí 901,555 2,802 788 87 −56 16.9% MAS 58%
Santa Cruz 3,370,059 3,695 4,166 86 −56 17.3% MDS 36%
Tarija 583,330 5,329 784 85 −56 4.1% UDA 42%
* Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística
** Number of protests between March 10th and September 10th, 2020
*** The governors of Beni andOruro changed during the pandemic. The four former and current governors are fromMAS, albeit different
factions of MAS.
**** Source: Organo Electoral Plurinacional. MAS is the largest party and for the time this manuscript covers was in the opposition.
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First, it is well established that corruption is tied to
disenchantment with political institutions and processes
(Morris and Klesner 2010; Seligson 2006; Canache and
Allison 2005). Some even suggest that when corruption is
pervasive, citizens turn pessimistic about political life and
lack the incentives to engage in democratic governance
(Svolik 2013; Myerson 2006). Second, corruption is
linked to the under-provision of public services (Fried,
Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010; Bearse, Glomm, and
Janeba 2000; Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999; Jain
1998; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993). While Boli-
via’s government put significant financial resources
towards fighting the pandemic, de jure policies mean little
in practice if the resources meant to enact these policies are
diverted into private pockets.
Data from the Americas Barometer by the Latin Ameri-
can Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2019 showed
that Bolivians were already concerned about corruption in
the public sector: 45.53% of respondents reported that
corruption among public officials was widespread
(LAPOP 2019). Hence, individuals entered the pandemic
with real concerns about political malfeasance. The cor-
ruption cases damaged what little legitimacy the interim
government had before the pandemic. While acts of
corruption have always been a problem in the country,
the case of the ventilators hit a nerve. A survey done by
Mercados y Muestras in August 2020 found that 50% of
respondents said that the biggest problem Bolivia faced is
corruption, while 28% said that COVID-19 was the
largest problem in the country (Mercados y Muestras
2020). That COVID-19 came as second in the minds of
Bolivians during the peak of the country’s pandemic
indicates that Bolivians see corruption as an obstacle to a
sufficient pandemic response.
The national government relaxed policy restrictions in
June 2020 in response to protests over its handling of the
pandemic, quarantine fatigue, and problems in the health-
care system.On June 1, the national government delegated
many pandemic policies to local governments. Opposition
governors quickly relaxed containment policies while
governors allied with the president maintained strict pol-
icies. The one exception was Beni, which had an oppos-
ition governor andmaintained strict policy. Beni is also the
president’s home state and experienced a severe outbreak in
May and June. Figure 1 shows each department’s policy
index fromMarch 10 to September 25, 2020, with dashed
vertical lines denoting June 1 and September 1.
Unlike other decentralized or federal political systems in
the region, Bolivia’s national and local governments
responded swiftly to the pandemic, taking drastic preventa-
tive measures. The national government implemented nine
of the ten policy dimensions covered by the Oxford Gov-
ernment Response Tracker within two weeks of the first
case. Due to the rapid national response, nearly all subna-
tional governments had a similar policy score for thefirst two
months of the pandemic in Bolivia, as figure 1 and table 3
demonstrate. Subnational governments diverged from each
other on June 1, with some relaxing restrictions and others
maintaining stringent policies. Subnational governments
again converged on policy measures by September 1, when
the national government relaxed measures and even the
most restrictive departmental governments opened work-
places, transportation, and internal borders.
Policy shows how departmental governments responded
to the pandemic and how deviations from national policy
largely followed partisan divides. Mobility data from
Android cell phones shows where the population complied
with quarantine measures and how citizens’ behavior
diverged across the country. Figure 2 plots daily cellphone
mobility by department. The dashed grey horizontal line
denotes baseline mobility, which was calculated from cell
phone mobility data in January and February 2020. The
vertical dashed lines mark June 1 and September 1, when
many local governments loosened quarantine restrictions.
The weekly peaks and troughs correspond to work days and
weekends; the national government maintained a stricter
curfew onweekends while allowing local governments to set
looser hours during the week.
The mobility data show that Bolivians decreased their
collective movement by 75% from the pre-pandemic
Table 4
Primary protest demands during the pandemic
March–July August–September
Demand Percentage Demand Percentage
Health 17.15 Pro-elections 54.66
Economic 15.09 Health 12.04
Pro-Elections 12.13 Economic 6.94
Resignation 8.28 Other 5.54
Other 7.10 Education 4.48
Policy change 6.51 Resignation 3.60
Allow work 6.51 Allow work 2.46
Release of person 5.92 Policy change 2.02
Education 5.03 Release of person 1.85
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baseline, one of the largest reductions in Latin America.
Bolivians across the nine departments complied with the
national quarantine but movement creeped up in May
with the announcement of the conditional and dynamic
quarantine. The decree establishing conditional and
dynamic quarantine mentioned that the public policies
of each local government, while under their prerogative,
should also be set in accordance with the risk conditions
of each municipality, which is determined by the Min-
istry of Health (Ministerio de la Presidencia 28 Mayo
2020). Risk conditions are divided into three: moderate,
medium, and high risk, and municipal risk indices are
published by the Ministry of Health every week. Also
under this framework, and independent of sub-national
governments, some public policies remained mandatory
throughout the country, such as the closure of schools
and borders, a curfew, a national information campaign,
the prohibition of events and crowds of people, and the
mandatory use of face masks (Ministerio de la Presiden-
cia 28 Mayo 2020).
In opposition departments that opened up on June
1, especially La Paz, Oruro, and Cochabamba, movement
increased markedly in June. By contrast, movement in the
allied departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz remained low.
Figure 1
Public policy index scores for each Bolivian department
Chuquisaca Santa Cruz Tarija
Beni Pando Potosi
Cochabamba La Paz Oruro
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The only departments that returned to pre-pandemic
mobility levels were the opposition-led departments of
Cochabamba and Pando.
After the national government relaxed restrictions and
devolved policy to local governments in June, cases quickly
increased in nearly every department. The new corona-
virus pandemic first peaked in Bolivia in July, in terms of
overall confirmed cases and deaths. Measured in con-
firmed cases per 100,000 residents, Bolivia’s outbreak
was higher than some larger regional powers, like Mexico,
but lower than Brazil and United States’ runaway out-
breaks. However, the high positivity rate strongly suggests
that many cases went undiagnosed.
When we disaggregate cases per 100,000 residents by
department in figure 3, we see different pandemic experi-
ences across Bolivia. Beni and Pando experienced large
outbreaks, especially after the latter opposition-led depart-
ment opened up in June. Opposition-led La Paz, Oruro,
and Potosi experienced large outbreaks in July, while pro-
government Tarija experienced a large outbreak after
loosening restrictions in July. The dashed vertical lines
mark June 1 and September 1.
At the height of the pandemic, and with several health
systems collapsing across departments, individuals sought
out their own treatments. Beni, an opposition-led depart-
ment, was the first to report an increase in the number of
Figure 2
Cellphone mobility data by department, daily observations
Chuquisaca Santa Cruz Tarija
Beni Pando Potosi
Cochabamba La Paz Oruro
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individuals self-medicating with hydroxychloroquine,
traditional medicine, and other over-the-counter options
as shortages, poverty, collapsed hospitals, and misinfor-
mation made professional medical help difficult to access
(Peredo 2020; Correo del Sur 2020). The health crisis in
Beni was so severe that local authorities passed a law
declaring a health disaster in the department in May
(Gobierno Autonomo Departamental del Beni 2020)
Mortality data by department and month paints a more
unequal and politically divided picture in figure 4. We
collected data on confirmed COVID-19 deaths daily from
the nine departments, but these deaths only count people
who tested positive for COVID-19 before they died.With
a severe national testing shortage, the official number of
deaths attributed to COVID-19 is a significant under-
count; many people died before reaching a hospital or
seeing a doctor. We collected data on total deaths reported
to SERECI by department and month, using data from
The New York Times and the SERECI (Trigo, Kurmanaev,
and McCann 2020).
Figure 4 shows a dramatic spike in deaths per 100,000
residents across the country in July. We calculated the
average number of deaths for each department by month
from 2016 to 2019 and used this as a baseline measure,
reported in the solid grey line in figure 4. The dashed gray
line tracks the number of confirmed COVID-19 deaths.
The solid black line is the total number of deaths reported
in each department. The SERECI offices closed in March
and April, accounting for the drop at the beginning of
quarantine. Figure 4 tabulates deaths per 100,000 people
from March to August 2020.
Figure 4 shows huge disparities in the pandemic’s
death toll across Bolivia. In Beni and Pando, oppos-
ition-led departments and the two poorest departments
with the fewest hospitals and beds per capita, the number
of overall deaths climbed to over seven times the average
number of deaths in July. In the opposition-led depart-
ments of La Paz and Oruro, the number of deaths was
nearly five times the average in July. In Cochabamba, it
was three times the average. In allied Tarija, the depart-
ment with the most wealth per capita and the most
cautious regional government, deaths peaked in August
at twice the normal rate.
The data illustrate our suggestion that partisan policies
explain as much or more than structural factors. Looking
at the case of La Paz, the administrative capital, we can see
how policy changes in opposition to the national govern-
ment coincided with high case counts and deaths, even
though the department has more funds and public health
resources than most departments. Prior to the pandemic,
La Paz and Santa Cruz had more hospitals and more
hospital beds per capita than other departments. La Paz
has a network of private doctors and clinics in addition to
the large public hospitals and there are medical supply
facilities in the greater La Paz metropolitan area.
Additionally, per capita income and savings are above
the national average. The La Paz city and departmental
governments are more responsive and efficient than many
other local governments and employ many experienced
bureaucrats, including teams who have worked on local-
ized epidemics in the past. Still, the governor quickly
rolled back lockdown policies on June 1 with confirmed
cases and deaths rapidly increasing soon after. The gov-
ernor did not return to lockdown following this increase
and in July 2020, La Paz recorded five times as many
deaths as the department typically records in July. This
staggering death toll was the third highest (measured as a
percentage increase over the average) in the country after
Beni and Pando, despite La Paz’s considerable resource
and structural advantages over most other departments.
The trend also holds at the municipal level with some of
the highest death tolls in municipalities with substantial
capacity but opposition mayors including the municipal-
ities of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Sucre, and Sacaba,
among others.
After two hundred days of political and public health
crises, data from protests, policy implementation, cases,
and deaths show that opposition-led departments were
more likely to relax their policies and then experience a
spike in cases and deaths, while opposition-dominated
populations were more likely to protest and move around
in defiance of quarantine. On a population-adjusted basis,
poor, opposition-led departments suffered the worst
increases in deaths.
Illustrative Cases
Bolivia entered the new coronavirus pandemic with an
interim government that did not enjoy generalized sup-
port or trust, and with a highly polarized society and
decentralized political systemwhere election losers showed
alarmingly low levels of support for the interim govern-
ment. These two factors shaped how the government
handled the pandemic and the degree of compliance from
the population. We delve further into pandemic experi-
ences in two large departments on opposite sides of the
legitimacy divide in order to illustrate our argument.
These two cases illustrate the opposition governor and
electorate and aligned governor and electorate categories
from table 1. We do not present a full case study on the
third category in table 1 because it encompasses experi-
ences that mix traits of the first two categories, producing
more moderate outcomes. Moreover, the vote share of the
departments in this category is more evenly distributed
among competing parties lending to a more evenly divided
electorate. In Beni, Comunidad Ciudadana (CC) and the
MAS each got 34.77% and 34.93% of the vote in the
2019 presidential elections respectively. In Chuquisaca,
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Cochabamba
Cochabamba offers an illustrative case for our classification
of opposition governor and opposition electorate and our
theoretical expectations. The MAS began in Cochabamba
as the political vehicle for locally powerful organizations of
coca growers, farmers, and indigenous people. The gov-
ernor of Cochabamba, Esther Soria, is from the MAS, and
the MAS candidates easily won the department in the
2019 and 2020 presidential elections. Cochabamba’s citi-
zens and political leaders vocally opposed the ascension of
Añez in 2019 and resisted her policies in 2020.
Referring back to our theoretical expectations in tables 1
and 2, we expect that policy in Cochabamba was less
restrictive than the national average and that citizens
moved around more and protested more than citizens in
pro-Añez departments. The qualitative and quantitative
data match our expectations. Cochabamba’s governor and
many mayors relaxed policy as soon as they legally could
and Cochabamba’s departmental policy score is below the
country’s average. Cochabamba is also one of the only
departments where mobility returned to pre-pandemic
levels.
Cochabamba experienced a massive wave of protests
between March and September and recorded the highest
number of protests of any department in the country.
Cochabamba hosted 24% of all protest events registered in
Figure 3
Daily cases per 100,000 by department
Chuquisaca Santa Cruz Tarija
Beni Pando Potosi
Cochabamba La Paz Oruro
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the country from March to September. Protests against
quarantine restrictions and for elections were particularly
common. The municipalities that saw the most protest
activity are agricultural centers and towns known as MAS
strongholds, including Colomi, Entre Rios, Puerto Villar-
roel, Punata, Quillacollo, Sacaba, Shinahota, Sipe Sipe,
Tapacari, Tiquipaya, Tiraque, and Villa Tunari. Pro-
election protests were particularly contentious in this
region of the country: protests blockaded large sections
of the department for almost two weeks in July and
August. Government health officials said the blockades
reduced the supply of oxygen and other medical supplies,
but protest organizers claimed they were allowing medical
workers, medical suppliers, and fuel to pass through the
blockades (Trigo, Kurmanaev,and McCann 2020).
The relationship between the Añez administration and
Governor Soria was contentious throughout the pan-
demic. In May, the interim government intervened in
Cochabamba’s departmental health services, and the Min-
istry of Health dismissed Eddy Calvimontes as Cocha-
bamba’s departmental health director and appointed
Miguel Ángel Delgado as the interim technical head of
this institution. Governor Soria rejected this intervention
and ratified Calvimontes as head of the Health Services,
Figure 4
Deaths per 100,000 people by department and month.
Chuquisaca Santa Cruz Tarija
Beni Pando Potosi
Cochabamba La Paz Oruro
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which led to two directors working in parallel and battling
over jurisdiction and legitimacy at the height of the public
health crisis.
The rhetoric used by several mayors from the MAS also
ran contrary to the national-level information campaign
on COVID-19. Notably, the mayor of Entre Rios muni-
cipality, Aurelio Rojas, who later died of COVID-19,
declared that the virus was an invention (Pagina Siete
Junio 2020). Several other mayors in Cochabamba and
La Paz made similar statements from “the virus doesn’t
exist” to “it is an invention from the right” (Brujula Digital
Mayo 2020). Even Governor Soria allegedly made state-
ments that cast doubt on the existence of the virus (Pagina
Siete Julio 2020).
We see health policy decisions within the department
falling along partisan lines as well. Not all municipalities,
political leaders, and voters in Cochabamba support the
MAS and it is exactly in those few municipalities con-
trolled by other political parties where mayors enacted
strict containment policy. In the city of Cochabamba (the
department and its capital city share the same name), the
mayor was not MAS-affiliated but belonged to the Social
Democratic Movement party (Movimiento Democrata
Social or MDS) and imposed earlier and stricter restric-
tions than the departmental government throughout the
pandemic. Still, with a largely opposition electorate, the
city of Cochabamba experienced moderate mobility and
some protests. Hence, in this case, our theoretical expect-
ations hold at the municipal level as well as the department
level.
Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz illustrates the pro-government governor and
divided electorate category and our expectations for that
category. The governor of Santa Cruz, Ruben Costas, is
from the Social Democratic Movement party (Movi-
miento Democrata Social or MDS) and the MAS did
not reach a majority of the vote in either the 2019 or
2020 presidential elections. Short-lived local parties Citi-
zens’ Community (Comunidad Ciudadana or CC) won
Santa Cruz in 2019 and We Believe (Creemos) won in
2020. Under these conditions, we expected the depart-
ment to enact strict containment policies and its citizens
to largely comply by staying home, reducing mobility,
and not protesting. Indeed, the governor of Santa Cruz
publicly backed all measures taken by the central gov-
ernment from the start of the pandemic. The department
started with the highest policy index in the country—
eleven, by enacting containment policies on the first day
that cases were identified—and consistently maintained
above average levels of restrictions. Santa Cruz’s citizens
drastically reduced their mobility in March and while
transportation increased slowly, mobility remained far
below pre-pandemic levels after 200 days.
Of all protest events registered in the country from
March to September, Santa Cruz witnessed 17.3%, the
second highest after Cochabamba. While this is contrary
to our expectations at the departmental level, our theor-
etical expectations are borne out when we look at the
geographic distribution of protests within the department:
protests were led by MAS supporters and concentrated in
municipalities whereMAS won a majority of votes in both
2019 and 2020. These included Yapacani, San Julián,
Cuatro Canadas, San Javier, Ascención de Guarayos,
Samaipata, and Pailón. In late July and early August,
MAS supporters protested across the country for the Añez
administration to stop rescheduling elections. In areas of
Santa Cruz where vote margins in the 2019 election had
been close, confrontations ensued between pro-Añez and
pro-MAS supporters. MAS supporters set up blockades on
dozens of roads and highways around Santa Cruz and pro-
Añez demonstrators in the city of Santa Cruz marched to
blockades in order to dismantle them (Santa Cruz, like
Cochabamba, is the name of the department and its capital
city). Some of these confrontations turned violent and led
to street battles between opposition and pro-government
citizens (Fides 2020). During the protests, opposition and
pro-government supporters broke the department’s
COVID-19 prevention measures that placed restrictions
on gatherings and public events. Anti-lockdown protests
were also common in regions like Yapacani, a MAS
stronghold, throughout the quarantine period (El Deber
2020). Similar to the case study of Cochabamba, a closer
examination of the pandemic experience in the Santa Cruz
department demonstrates how citizens’ and local leaders’
pandemic policies and compliance fell along largely parti-
san lines.
National Policymaking and Chlorine Dioxide
National policymaking and the debates between the Añez
administration and the MAS-dominated legislature fur-
ther illustrate how pandemic policy broke down along
partisan lines, in occasionally counterintuitive and dan-
gerous ways. The relationship between the interim execu-
tive and the legislature was characterized by constant
clashes and an evident lack of consensus on public health
policies related to the management of the pandemic. Of
the many conflicts between the two branches of govern-
ment, two are worth noting: the use of chlorine dioxide
and the approval of International Monetary Fund (IMF)
credits for a health stimulus check known as the Bono
Salud.
The MAS-dominated legislature enacted a law promot-
ing chlorine dioxide as a treatment for COVID-19, reject-
ing recommendations from the Añez-appointed Minister
of Health and against the advice of the Bolivian and
international scientific community (Gaceta Oficial del
Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2020, Trigo, Kurmanaev,
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and Cabrera 2020). Chlorine dioxide is a bleach variant
used to clean floors and can be toxic if ingested. Pharma-
cies across Bolivia sold chlorine dioxide as a tonic and it
became particularly sought after inMAS-dominated areas.
The same dynamic was reproduced at the subnational level
where MAS-dominated departmental assemblies in La Paz
and Cochabamba passed laws approving the use and
distribution of chlorine dioxide, with Cochabamba’s law
including the distribution of the chemical compound to
the population free of charge. The governors of La Paz and
Cochabamba, who opposed Añez, signed department
legislation. After these laws were enacted, the Ministry
of Health, as well as several departmental health services,
continued to release information warning against the use
of chlorine dioxide (Los Tiempos 2020; Brujula Digital
Julio 2020).
The fracture between the executive and the legislature
came to the fore again with the approval of IMF credits to
ease the economic crisis. The strict quarantine between
March and May 2020 paralyzed economic activity across
Bolivia and the Añez administration turned to the IMF for
a loan. The Añez administration used part of the loan to
write the Bono Salud stimulus checks. When in power, the
MAS had promoted several huge universal social assistance
policies similar to Bono Salud. Massive redistribution,
particularly during crisis, is a core tenet of the MAS
platform and ideology. Additionally, the MAS voter base
suffered bigger economic losses from the lockdown than
Añez’s support base (Blofield and Filgueira 2020). Still,
the legislative assembly was loath to hand Añez anything
resembling a victory and thus voted to stop the approval of
credits, arguing a lack of documentation. Moreover, the
MAS as well as other political parties and grassroots
associations argued that the interim president was using
the health stimulus to run an electoral campaign (Los
Tiempos 2020; Corz and Aguirre 2020)
The departmental and legislative case studies illustrate
how a crisis of legitimacy at the national level politicized
public health policy during the pandemic. Political oppon-
ents at the national, departmental, and municipal level
clashed and undermined each other’s policies—even when
doing so endangered constituents and went against their
professed ideology.
Conclusion
Bolivia exemplifies the challenges of an effective policy
response to a crisis in the context of high polarization and
low government legitimacy. The decision to decentralize
health policy under these conditions furthered the crisis of
legitimacy that hampered the pandemic response across
Bolivia. The challenge of implementing unpopular policy
responses that limit personal freedoms, such as issuing stay
at home orders and mask mandates, are enormous, even
for strong, legitimate, and popular governments. The lack
of legitimacy faced by the Bolivian national government
was not resolved by transferring health policy authority to
local governments. Instead, the deep political divisions
over the legitimacy of the government continued to
undermine compliance with public health measures and
fueled protests against national and local governments.
Decentralizing health policy in this context also exacer-
bated underlying inequalities and created more opportun-
ities for opposition leaders to politicize the crisis,
contributing to devastating losses of life.
Countries around the world, including the United
States, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, India, South Africa,
Venezuela, and Chile, have also experienced polarization
and uneven pandemic responses. Across the world, low
legitimacy and political polarization undermined compli-
ance with public health directives as feuds between
national and regional governments politicized mask use,
quarantine measures, and social distancing, as well as
spread misinformation. In the United States, Brazil, and
Bolivia, people who did not trust government institutions
self-medicated with bleach and related products. What-
sApp and YouTube replaced health ministries as reliable
sources of information in Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, and
the United States.
Importantly, the case of Bolivia suggests that polariza-
tion and its partisan dynamics, not ideology, drive the
politicization of health policy. In Bolivia, a right-wing
government instituted strict policy and leftist governors
relaxed it while leftist citizens devoured dangerous misin-
formation and chlorine dioxide. This runs counter to the
lax response of right-wing governments in the United
States and Brazil, who peddledmisinformation and hydro-
xychloroquine to their own supporters. Bolivia’s experi-
ence does mirror the United States’ and Brazil’s polarized
politics and partisan, rather than ideological, struggles over
policy. Our findings suggest that during health crises in a
polarized environment, the response becomes extremely
politicized and the opposition will resist the national
government’s policy regardless of ideology.
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